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INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the federal government made large-scale changes to income assistance,
replacing the entitlement Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program with the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Under TANF, state policymakers
were given significant freedom to craft their own approaches to public assistance (Nathan 1996).
It is now generally acknowledged that states have responded in diverse ways that systematically
reflect their social, economic, and political characteristics (Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Gais and
Weaver 2000; Soss et al. 2001).
What is perhaps less often appreciated about welfare reform under TANF is that
devolution of authority from the federal government to state governments has been accompanied
by a significant decentralization of policymaking authority within states as well. TANF’s
emphasis on flexible services and sanctioning virtually ensured that decision making would be
pushed downward to local implementers, including case managers, who serve as the primary
“street level bureaucrats” in the new world of welfare service delivery. However, many states
have further expanded local discretion in TANF implementation by pursuing “second-order”
devolution – formal transfers of state control to county governments and/or to local
public/private governance boards (Nathan and Gais 1999). Although there is little systematic
data on the extent of second-order devolution in welfare policy, a recent study estimates that by
2001, at least 20 states had engaged in either “slight” or “significant” amounts (Gainsborough
2003).
Advocates of welfare decentralization have successfully argued that devolution promotes
TANF goals by fostering innovation and flexibility in meeting client needs. This is critical to
TANF’s success, supporters say, because employment barriers are best identified and addressed
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by local decision makers who know local needs and resources. Decentralization, however, is not
without its critics. Many observers have pointed out that, with greater discretion for local actors,
significant variation is likely to emerge in the range of TANF policies and the quality of TANF
services across local jurisdictions. Some also speculate that variation in local TANF practices
may be driven less by needs and resources, and more by local values and ideology.
Understandably, this debate has renewed attention to the ways welfare administrators put
“policy into action” (Lennon and Corbett 2003). Increasingly, scholars and practitioners are
asking how policy effects may be mediated by dynamic interactions among incentives,
organizational forms, cultures, and personnel found in welfare agencies (Ewalt and Jennings
2004; Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 2001). In this paper, we contribute to this literature by
examining the impact of decentralization on one of the most consequential aspects of reform: the
use of sanctions to penalize recipients who fail to fulfill TANF requirements. Although a number
of studies have examined the determinants of sanctioning, they have almost exclusively focused
on client characteristics, and thus have implicitly ignored possible variation in sanctioning due to
the effects of implementation. Thus, we seek to add to our understanding of sanction outcomes
by addressing two specific questions. First, to what extent has welfare decentralization led to
variation in the use of TANF sanctioning across local jurisdictions operating under the same
sanction policy? Second, are local differences in sanctioning solely a function of variation in
client characteristics, or is the use of sanctioning also influenced by the local implementation
environment?
To answer these questions, we examine sanctioning outcomes in the state of Florida,
which stands as a leader in welfare decentralization and second-order devolution. Relying on
administrative data for over 64,000 TANF clients provided by the Florida Department of
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Children and Families, we conduct a series of analyses which examine the relationship between
individual sanction outcomes and (1) individual client traits, (2) local social and economic
conditions, and (3) the local political environment. Our results suggest that a significant amount
of local variation exists in sanctioning outcomes across the state of Florida, even after controlling
for the characteristics of TANF clients. Moreover, local patterns in sanctioning outcomes are not
random, but are systematically related to selected characteristics of the local community,
including the ideological tendency of the local implementation environment.

WELFARE REFORM AND SANCTIONING UNDER TANF
Sanctions have long been used by caseworkers to encourage compliance with state
welfare rules. Over the past decade, however, sanctions have come to play a more prominent role
in welfare implementation because, under the TANF program, clients now confront stricter work
requirements, narrower exemption criteria, an expanded menu of behaviors subject to sanction,
and stronger penalties for noncompliance (Hasenfeld and Powell 2004). Indeed, most analysts
agree that sanctions have been a linchpin of the successful effort to transform welfare from a
system focused on providing cash benefits (AFDC), to one focused on the promotion of work
norms (TANF).
Federal legislation requires that TANF clients be subject to a reduction in benefits for
failure to follow a number of different program rules. The vast majority of sanctions, however,
are imposed for failure to comply with work requirements. Under TANF, states have a range of
options in determining exactly how benefits should be reduced, the most important of which
include (i) whether to reduce the benefit for the adult(s) or the entire family, and (ii) whether and
when to impose a partial or full reduction of benefits. Seventeen states have adopted the strictest
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combination of these choices, enforcing what are referred to as “immediate full-family
sanctions.” In these states, the entire TANF family is immediately removed from the TANF rolls
at the first instance of noncompliance. Fifteen states use “gradual full-family sanctions,” which
potentially have the same impact, but only after continued noncompliance. The remaining states
enforce what are known as “partial sanctions,” which result in a partial reduction of benefits
(usually affecting only the adult portion of the grant) (Pavetti, Derr and Hesketh 2003).
The impact of TANF sanctioning can be measured in a number of ways, all of which
suggest that sanctioning has had significant effects on both the size and characteristics of the
TANF caseload. In one of the first studies to document the full impact of sanctions in the TANF
era, Goldberg and Schott (2000) estimated that the number of families who lost benefits from
1997 to 1999 was close to 500,000, or a quarter of the reduction in the TANF caseload during
that period. Other studies have focused on selected states, and have found the incidence of
sanctioning to be quite significant. Given these estimates, it is not surprising that many statelevel studies of caseload reduction conclude that states with the strictest sanctioning policies
have experienced as much as a 25 percent greater caseload reduction than states with the least
stringent policies (Mead 2000; Rector and Youseff 1999).
Several studies have also examined the characteristics of sanctioned families, using either
surveys of TANF recipients or state administrative data. The findings converge on the conclusion
that sanctioned clients tend to exhibit the characteristics of long-term welfare recipients (Pavetti,
Derr and Hesketh 2003; Wu 2004). Specifically, these studies find that the probability of being
sanctioned is related to a client’s race, marital status, age, family size, education level and job
experience (Born, Caudill and Cordero 1999; Hasenfeld, Ghose, and Hillesland-Larson 2002;
Kalil, Seefeldt, and Wang 2002; Koraleck 2000; Mancuso and Liner 2001; Westra and Routely

5
2000). Together with findings on the overall incidence of sanctioning, these studies suggest that
sanctioning practices have greatly affected the characteristics of the TANF population.
Despite this progress in analyzing sanctions, the literature has paid surprisingly little
attention to the decentralized implementation processes at the heart of welfare reform. Indeed,
given recent developments, it is remarkable how little we know about the question that anchors
this study: In the context of unprecedented decentralization of authority in welfare provision,
how do local differences in policy implementation affect the imposition of TANF sanctions?
There is some evidence that, within states, sanction rates vary across locales with different social
and political characteristics (Keiser, Meuser, and Choi 2004), and different sanctioning
philosophies and procedures (Pavetti et al. 1998; Born, Caudill and Cordero 1999; Koralek
2000). These few studies notwithstanding, however, the consequences of dispersed local
implementation remain a blind spot in our understanding of sanction processes and outcomes.
Indeed, as Pavetti, Derr and Hesketh (2003) conclude in their recent review of sanction research,
“there is scant literature on implementation of sanctions. Although there is some evidence to
suggest that sanction rates vary from one local office to the next, there has been very little
research to assess what might contribute to these differences” (25). We address these questions
below.

DEVOLUTION, DISCRETION, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TANF
SANCTIONS
Our central argument in this paper is that welfare reform has been accompanied by a
significant, and in recent decades, unprecedented devolution of policymaking discretion to local
actors in the TANF implementation process. In turn, we expect that this decentralization has
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resulted in significant and systematic variation in the use of TANF sanctions within states due to
the exercise of discretion by two sets of actors in the TANF implementation process: (1) local
TANF supervisors and regional policymakers, whose discretion in TANF implementation has
increased significantly in many states due to second-order devolution, and (2) TANF case
managers, who are charged with the responsibility of monitoring client behavior and initiating
sanctions when TANF rules are violated. Below, we discuss each source of discretion, along
with hypotheses regarding their collective impact on the implementation of sanctions.
Second-Order Devolution
Public and scholarly debate has most often focused on “first-order” devolution of policy
authority from federal to state governments (Conlan 1998; Osbourne 1988). In the welfare arena,
significant first-order devolution began during the George H.W. Bush administration when states
were encouraged to apply for AFDC waivers to experiment with policies such as time limits,
family caps, and “workfare.” Devolution accelerated in 1996 with the adoption of the TANF
program, as evidenced by a number of important changes: the shift from a matching grant to a
block grant, increased state discretion in eligibility determination, and greater flexibility in the
range of services states can provide to welfare recipients.
Under welfare reform, these patterns of first-order devolution have been closely followed
by “second-order” devolution, defined as the transfer of policy authority from state governments
to counties or other local governing bodies (Nathan and Gais 1999). Second-order devolution has
taken two general forms. In the most common model, 14 states have devolved policy authority to
county governments. Ten of these states previously shared AFDC administrative duties with
counties, suggesting that stronger capacities at the county level may have encouraged some states
to devolve authority. These 14 states have varied in the types of duties they have devolved. In
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states with the most significant devolution, counties have gained substantial control over
spending (through block grants) and now enjoy significant discretion over TANF work
requirements, sanctions, time limits, and the use of one-time diversion payments (Gainsborough
2003). In the second model of second-order devolution, implemented in six states, policy
authority has been devolved to local/regional governing boards rather than county governments.
In all six states, welfare services have been linked to state workforce development programs
operating under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). Welfare and workforce development
programs are collectively administered through a statewide system of one-stop centers, which are
overseen by regional workforce boards. These boards, which are mandated by WIA, consist of a
mixture of public and private officials. The states vary in their exact rules for board composition,
but in most states at least half of the board’s members must come from the local business
community (Gainsborough 2003). As with the delegation of authority to counties, there is some
variation in the power these boards have over TANF policy. According to Gainsborough (2003),
Florida, Michigan, and Texas have ceded significantly greater amounts of authority to their
regional workforce boards than have Arkansas, Tennessee and Utah.
Case Manager Discretion
As the frontline workers in the public welfare system, case managers have always
enjoyed significant discretion in their interactions with clients. This discretion has increased
considerably under TANF due to the increase in the number of rules governing client behavior,
and the proportion of clients to which these rules must now be applied. Thus, today more than
ever, case managers exercise a considerable degree of choice as they process clients’ cases, and
their choices shape what public policies actually mean and do in practice (Lipsky 1980; Prottas
1979).

8
In principle, supervision may be used to limit or guide case manager discretion.
Caseworkers, however, rarely operate under the direct watch of supervisors (Prottas 1979). They
handle cases that are too complex and idiosyncratic to fit neatly under a supervisor’s a priori
directive, and they process cases at rates that make continual consultation impractical (MaynardMoody and Musheno 2003). Administrative rules offer a second source of constraint. But while
general rules do place broad limits on caseworkers, they cannot be designed to cover all
conceivable situations, nor can a rule “itself step forward to claim its own instance” (Hart 1961:
123). Choices must be made about how and when to apply a given rule, and as the number of
rules grows, so too does the scope of frontline decision making. Rather than eliminating
discretion, “a profusion of rules can lead to greater freedom because… the bureaucrat must
choose which rules are appropriate in the present [case]” (Feldman 1992: 166; Lipsky 1980: 14).
A third possible check on caseworker discretion comes from program clients, who may
use formal or informal means to limit decisions contrary to their interests. Here again, however,
theory and evidence suggest a weak constraint. Political economy approaches to social work
theory argue that welfare clients occupy a dependent position in a relationship defined by
unequal control of power resources (Hasenfeld 1987). To be sure, clients are active participants
in welfare interactions who do what they can to subtly influence outcomes, but field research
suggests that welfare clients feel a keen sense of their dependence on case managers: most report
that they avoid explicit opposition because they view it as a risky and ineffective maneuver (Soss
2000). Under the TANF program, moreover, clients have lost entitlement status as well as some
formal rights of appeal – developments that seem likely to have further weakened clients’
abilities to impose limits on caseworker discretion (Mink 2002).
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In light of these weak constraints, it has become conventional wisdom that “discretion is
inevitable” in street-level work (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000: 329). Decision making on
the frontlines is widely recognized as a political process that elaborates, transforms, and
sometimes subverts the policy intentions of lawmakers (Meier 1999). Such discretion may serve
as an entry point for unjust and unequal treatment or, alternatively, may permit the tailoring of
more equitable and humane responses than one would expect based on the rules alone (Keiser
1999: 88-89). In either case, empirical research suggests that frontline discretion can produce
wide variation in policy implementation even across a unitary federal program (Keiser and Soss
1998) or within a highly centralized state welfare program (Riccucci 2005).
Despite this fact, it remains unclear if or how this discretion might be affecting the
implementation of TANF sanctions. Based on existing research, there appears to be ample
opportunity for the exercise of discretion in sanction implementation. This is clearly the case in
states where important decisions about the structure of sanction policies have been delegated to
local governments through second-order devolution. However, in the most comprehensive
review of TANF sanction research to date, Pavetti, Derr and Hesketh (2003: 6) find that even
when TANF offices operate under a common set of state guidelines, local actors are able to
exercise considerable discretion at a number of key points in the sanction implementation
process. These include:
•

the process by which clients are informed of TANF rules and the consequences
for breaking them

•

the assessment of client needs and identification of clients unable to participate in
regular work activities

•

the process by which participation in required activities is monitored
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•

the interpretation and application of “good cause” exceptions, which essentially
grant clients an “excused absence” from participation in required work activities

•

the process by which sanctions are initiated, including the method and timing of
contact with clients informing them of an impending sanction

•

the process by which clients are re-engaged, including the requirements for
curing a sanction.

While all of these points in the implementation process offer an opportunity for local
policymakers to exercise discretion, perhaps the most important is the interpretation of “good
cause” exceptions. In addition to federally mandated reasons for excusing violations of work
requirements, such as the lack of child care, lack of transportation, or illness, good cause
exceptions may also be granted due to “circumstances beyond the client’s control.” The
definition of such “circumstances,” at least to some degree, is left to local TANF administrators
and case managers. Along with other opportunities for exercising discretion, this offers local
policymakers significant control over the use of sanctioning, as sanction policies may be either
loosely or narrowly interpreted and applied. Consequently, we expect to see significant
differences in the implementation of sanctions across local communities due to the exercise of
local discretion.
Politics and the Implementation of Sanctions
Theories of organizational culture emphasize that bureaucratic norms and understandings
should not be seen as autonomous, insider worldviews, disconnected from their broader social
milieus; rather, organizational cultures derive from, elaborate upon, and reflect commonsense
understandings in the broader communities in which they are embedded (Martin 1992; Feldman
1989; Herzfeld 1992). Local environments may affect organizational operations through
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democratic pressures, because policymakers respond to local social conditions and needs, or
because officials share the ideological values of the community at large. Consistent with this
thinking, a number of studies have found local implementation of public policy to be influenced
by the local political environment (e.g., Cho et al. 2005; Goggin et al. 1990; Weissert 1994). We
expect this to be no less true with respect to the implementation of TANF sanctions, especially in
states that have devolved significant authority over TANF to the local level.
Our conceptualization of the “political environment” in this study is based on the classic
liberal-conservative dimension, which has repeatedly been shown to be an important determinant
of support for welfare generosity in state-level studies of AFDC and TANF (e.g. Barrilleaux,
Holbrook and Langer 2002; Fording 1997; Soss et al. 2001). In states with significant local
control, the political characteristics of local environments might affect sanctioning outcomes in
different ways through the actions of three important local actors in the TANF implementation
process: case managers, local TANF policymakers, and local advocacy groups. First, local
political culture could influence the sanction decisions of case managers who are likely to share
the political values of the larger community (Riccucci 2005). Survey research has consistently
found that liberals are generally more likely to attribute the causes of poverty to structural
explanations and to support welfare assistance (Cook and Barrett 1992). Accordingly, one would
expect liberal case managers to be more sympathetic to TANF clients in their interpretation and
application of TANF rules (Morgen 2001). Case managers in more conservative environments,
on the other hand, may be more likely to attribute poverty to individual shortcomings, and
therefore be less sympathetic to TANF clients who have fallen out of compliance with TANF
rules (Keiser, Mueser and Choi 2004). Thus, we should expect that conservative case managers
will be more willing to issue sanctions to TANF clients than liberal case managers.
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Second, in a decentralized policymaking environment one might also expect the political
orientations of local environments to generate differences in the makeup and behavior of local
agencies that are responsible for interpreting state sanction policies and guiding the activities of
case managers in their jurisdiction (Cho et al. 2005). In some states, county government officials
may have a significant role in this regard, while in states that have merged their TANF and
workforce development programs, local employers and community leaders may have significant
influence through representation on local workforce boards (Gainesborough 2003). In either
case, we expect the degree of local conservatism to be positively related to stringency in the local
operating procedures that govern sanctioning, thus leading to higher levels of sanctioning.
Third and finally, local political environments may influence the overall sanction rates
through their effects on the presence and strength of local advocacy groups for the poor. Such
groups could potentially exert influence on local operating procedures, either indirectly through
advocacy aimed at local TANF policymakers or directly (in some states) through their
representation on local workforce boards. In addition, contact with liberal welfare advocacy
groups provides welfare clients with a crucial source of information and support (Handler 1992),
a factor that some field research suggests can positively affect client-worker interactions (Soss
2000). Thus, whether the effect is through the actions of case managers, local administrators, or
local advocacy groups, we expect that the level of local conservatism should be positively related
to local sanctioning.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Case Selection: Why Study Florida?
We have chosen Florida as the setting for our study, not because it is typical, but because
it offers a superb opportunity to examine relevant policy arrangements in strong form, as they
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intersect with one another to form a dynamic policy transaction (on this logic of case selection,
see Yin 2003; Ragin 2000). Three kinds of characteristics stand out. First, Florida has pursued
one of the strongest forms of second-order devolution in the country, blending transfers of
authority to local actors, program integration, and widespread privatization. Since July 1, 2000,
the Florida TANF program (Welfare Transitions, WT) and operations related to the WIA
program have been co-located in one-stop centers and subject to integrated implementation.
Frontline services have been contracted out to public, non-profit, and for-profit providers
throughout the entire state. Policy authority for these programs has shifted to the local level in a
group of 24 public/private partnerships called Regional Workforce Boards (RWBs). These
RWBs are responsible for strategic planning, policy development, contracting, and oversight of
local one-stop delivery systems. They are overseen, not by state agencies, but by a statewide
public/private partnership called Workforce Florida, Inc. (WFI). The Florida Department of
Children and Families (DCF), a conventional state agency, receives the federal TANF block
grant and maintains responsibility for eligibility determination. But otherwise, Florida is a
standout among American states for its strong emphasis on local control and privatization within
an integrated work-oriented policy system (Botsko et al. 2001: 7).
Second, Florida scores high on factors that raise the importance of sanction
implementation. After 1996, Florida adopted “some of the strictest time limits and work
requirements in the nation” and broadened the pool of clients subject to sanctions by creating
“few possibilities for exemptions” (Botsko et al. 2001: 4). The sanctions themselves also fall at
the strong end of the continuum, resulting in an immediate, full-family loss of TANF benefits
and a reduction of Food Stamp benefits to the fullest extent permitted by federal law (Botsko et
al. 2001: 6). Moreover, while cross-state comparisons are complicated by the diverse methods

14
used to calculate sanction frequency, as we will detail below, our analysis of Florida
administrative data suggests that Florida employs sanctions at an extremely high rate. Indeed,
Florida DCF identified sanctions as the most common cause of TANF case closings in fiscal year
2003, accounting for 31 percent of closings vs. 21 percent for increased earnings.
Finally, Florida is an ideal choice for our analysis because it offers significant variation
for one of the most important variables thought to influence sanctions implementation – the local
political environment. In addition, Florida displays great diversity in local economic and social
conditions. In combination with Florida’s heavy emphasis on sanctioning and its decentralized
approach to welfare reform, this variation in political, social and economic characteristics across
the state provides an ideal setting for a study of the joint effects of these characteristics on local
sanction implementation.
Data and Hypotheses
To examine the determinants of sanction usage, we employ an event history analysis of
the initiation of a sanction. Our sample consists of individual-level administrative data for all
adults receiving TANF in Florida, supplemented with contextual data indicating how local
implementing environments vary across 66 of the state’s 67 counties.1 Using these data, we
estimate event history models of TANF sanctioning, where a dichotomous dependent variable
indicates whether or not a client has been sanctioned, and the independent variables include
individual-level measures capturing client effects, and county-level measures capturing
community-context effects.2 Based upon past research on sanctions, we include a number of
variables to control for variation in clients’ individual characteristics. These include gender, age

1

Administrative data for Glades county are unavailable.
We provide detailed variable descriptions in the appendix, including data sources and
descriptive statistics for each variable used in the analyses that follow.

2
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of client, single parent status, wage income, and education level. We also control for a client’s
race/ethnicity by identifying clients as belonging to one of three mutually exclusive racial/ethnic
group combinations: black, Hispanic, and white (non-Hispanic).3 Most of these variables have
been found to be important determinants of individual sanctioning outcomes in past research
(Wu 2004; Born, Caudill and Cordero 1999; Hasenfeld, Ghose and Hillesland-Larson 2002;
Kalil, Seefeldt and Wang 2002; Koraleck 2000; Mancuso and Liner 2001).
To capture the effects of the local political environment, we rely on a measure of local
political ideology, conceptualized in traditional liberal-conservative terms. Unlike the case for
individual or state-level research, estimating the relationship between ideology and welfare
generosity at the local level poses a difficult challenge due to the lack of a readily available
measure of local ideology. In light of this, the most common strategy used to measure local
ideology is to rely on county partisanship, as reflected in election returns (e.g. Keiser, Meuser
and Choi 2004; Cho et al. 2005). However, it is well-known that partisanship tends to be
imperfectly related to political ideology (Miller 1999), and therefore this strategy is likely to
introduce measurement error into our analysis. As an alternative to relying on local partisanship,
we construct an original measure of local political ideology which we believe comes closer to
measuring the concept we are truly interested in measuring. For each county, we coded election
results for 18 ideologically relevant constitutional amendments that appeared on the ballot
throughout the entire state between 1996 and 2004.4 Based on the results of a factor analysis of
support for all 18 amendments, we then used the factor scores to create an index of county
ideology for our analysis of sanctioning outcomes. The index is scaled to range from 0 to 1, with
3

A very small percentage (<2%) of cases are classified as “other race” by the state. We omit
these individuals from our sample. We also restrict our analysis to citizens, due to the unique
challenges faced by noncitizens on TANF.
4
A list of the subjects of these amendments is presented in the appendix.
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0 representing the most liberal county (Gadsen), and 1 representing the most conservative county
(Clay).
We validated our measure of county conservatism in two ways. First, if our measure of
local ideology is valid, we expect that it should be at least moderately related to local
partisanship. This proves to be the case as the simple correlation between our measure of county
conservatism and a measure of the average Republican vote share in recent presidential elections
is reasonably strong at .65 (p < .05, N=67).5 Second, we merged survey results from two
different statewide surveys that measure liberal-conservative self-identification at the individual
level. We then calculated county means across these survey responses for the 8 counties with at
least 50 respondents represented in the merged sample.6 The relationship between our
amendment-based measure of county conservatism and the survey-based measure for these 8
counties is presented in the scatterplot shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, our conservatism
index corresponds well with the survey-based measure as the two measures are correlated at .85.
Thus, we are confident that we have constructed a valid measure of local ideology.
(Figure 1)
In addition to the effects of local ideology, we also consider one additional dimension of
the local political environment: the local racial context. Studies of racial politics and policy
outcomes have often found that the racial context has a significant impact on racially relevant
policy outcomes, either through the effects of a “racial threat” felt by the white majority (Blalock
1967; Key 1949), or the effects of increased minority political power (Keech 1968). While we

5

Specifically, our measure of the Republican vote share is a measure of the two-party vote share
in the presidential elections of 1996, 2000, and 2004.
6
The surveys used to create these scores were the Florida Voter Panel Study conducted in 1999
(ICPSR 3435), and a CBS/New York Times survey of Florida voters conducted in 2000 (ICPSR
3223). The average sample size for the eight counties used in this analysis was 95.
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expect that either effect might exist, if Keiser, Mueser and Choi’s (2004) results for Missouri
offer any guidance, we should expect that sanction rates will be lower in counties with larger
minority populations. Accordingly, we include the percentage of the county population that is
black and Hispanic, respectively.
In addition to variables representing the local political environment, we also include
additional contextual measures to capture the effects of local labor markets and the extent of
local employment opportunities, which are expected to affect sanctioning outcomes in one of two
ways. First, where employment opportunities are relatively numerous and attractive, TANF
clients may be more likely to work enough hours to avoid falling out of compliance with TANF
rules. Alternatively, local labor market conditions may also influence sanctioning outcomes
through their effects on local administrators and case managers who may be more sympathetic to
TANF clients, and thus less supportive of stringent enforcement of TANF rules, when job
opportunities are less numerous or less attractive. To capture these potential effects, we include
the county unemployment rate, the poverty rate, the level of urbanization (as measured by county
population), and the annual local wage in food service/drinking establishments.
We also include a measure of the local TANF caseload, measured as the number of
TANF adults (per 1,000 county population). As the caseload size increases, we might expect
that, all else equal, administrative pressures to reduce the caseload would result in an increase in
sanctioning. Alternatively, as the caseload size increases, if the number of case managers
remains fixed, individual case managers may have less time to closely monitor TANF clients for
violations of rules, thus resulting in a lower rate of sanctioning. Finally, we control for possible
seasonal effects in sanctioning by including dummy variables for each calendar month.
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RESULTS
As background to our analysis, we first provide a detailed description of the Florida
TANF population, followed by an examination of aggregate trends in sanctioning across time
and across counties. We then present the results of our multivariate analysis, which relies on an
event history model of TANF sanctioning to estimate the individual and contextual determinants
of TANF sanctioning.
Florida’s TANF Caseload
Our TANF administrative data span the period January 2000 through early 2004. During
this period, the size of the adult caseload decreased significantly, as it has in many other states.
This can be seen by examining Figure 2, which displays monthly caseload trends for the entire
state. In panel A of the figure, we see that in early 2000, the TANF caseload exceeded 40,000
adults. However, the caseload steadily decreased in size throughout 2000 and early 2001,
reaching a period low of just under 25,000 adults in mid-2001. Since that time, the average
monthly caseload has remained relatively stable, displaying seasonal fluctuations around a mean
of approximately 27,000 TANF adults from mid-2001 through the first quarter of 2004.
The lower panel (B) of Figure 2 displays monthly TANF caseload trends by ethnic/racial
identification. The figure clearly indicates that throughout the entire period, black adults have
comprised the largest share of the adult TANF population, representing nearly half of all TANF
adults in the early months of 2000. After 2000, the monthly percentage of black TANF adults
declined and has averaged 43-44% since 2001. White and Hispanic TANF recipients have
comprised nearly identical shares of the TANF population, although in recent years the number
of white adults has slightly, but consistently, outnumbered Hispanic adults on a monthly basis.
Given these changes in the relative shares of each racial/ethnic group since 2000, this suggests
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that a slightly disproportionate share of the decline in the TANF caseload that was experienced
during this period was due to a greater number of blacks, and to some degree Hispanics, leaving
the TANF rolls.
(Figure 2)
Our data indicate that approximately 268,000 adults received TANF for at least one
month during the period spanning January 2000 – April 2004. In Table 1, we present a snapshot
of selected characteristics of these adults, along with comparative figures reported by the federal
government for the national TANF population during fiscal year 2002. Like TANF clients in
other states, TANF adults in Florida are overwhelming female, single, and disproportionately
populated by racial and ethnic minorities. The average age of TANF adults in Florida was
approximately 31, which is almost identical to the national figure. In contrast to national figures,
our data suggest that Florida’s TANF population is slightly less educated and somewhat more
likely to consist of noncitizens than the national TANF population. Overall, however, Table 1
suggests that Florida’s TANF population is highly representative of the national TANF
population and thus provides for an ideal laboratory for exploring the correlates of sanctioning.
Statewide Sanctioning Rates
Along with many other states, the state of Florida employs immediate, full-family
sanctions to penalize clients who fall out of compliance with TANF requirements. In addition to
having a relatively strict written policy, an inspection of statewide sanctioning data suggests that
sanctions are rather frequently enforced in Florida as well. We begin our analysis of sanctions by
examining aggregate trends in sanctioning over time. These trends are displayed in panels A and
B of Figure 3. In panel A, we can see that the number of sanctions issued each month was
relatively stable between 2000 and 2004, with occasional fluctuations around a mean of about
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3200 sanctions per month. To provide some perspective on this figure, Figure 3A also displays
the number of TANF exits that occurred for reasons unrelated to sanctions, or what we refer to as
non-sanction exits. Since 2001, non-sanction exits have remained stable, averaging
approximately 5800 exits each month. This therefore implies that from 2001 through 2003,
sanction exits averaged slightly more than one-third of all monthly TANF exits in Florida. Panel
B of Figure 3 provides additional perspective and displays sanctioning frequency as a percentage
of the entire TANF adult caseload. Since the stabilization of the caseload in 2001, the percentage
of TANF adults sanctioned each month has averaged just over 11 percent.
(Figure 3)
While Florida does appear to rely heavily on sanctions as a policy tool, this conclusion
would be further supported by a comparison of sanction rates in Florida to sanction rates in other
states. This task is complicated, to some degree, by inconsistencies in the severity of sanction
policies across states. That is, in states that impose some form of partial sanction, TANF case
managers may be more willing to issue a sanction because the consequences for TANF clients
are less severe. However, despite the fact that Florida’s sanction policy is the strictest allowed by
federal law, sanction rates in Florida appear to be quite high when compared to other states. The
most commonly reported sanction statistic is the percentage of cases closed due to sanctions. As
we have seen, over the period of our study, approximately one third of all case closings in
Florida are due to sanctions. In contrast, the most recent data reported by the federal government
(for fiscal year 2002) show that nationwide, only 7 percent of all case closings were due to
sanctions.7

7

These data are reported by the Office of Family Assistance in their Sixth Annual Report to
Congress (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/annualreport6/chapter10/chap10.htm).
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Recognizing the fact that such statistics are in part a function of the number of nonsanction exits, Pavetti et al. (2004) recommend a “purer” measure of sanctioning which is based
on the cumulative incidence of sanctioning for a panel of clients over a significant period of
time. Using this method, they measured the sanction rate in three states that use immediate, fullfamily sanctions – Illinois, New Jersey, and South Carolina. For Illinois and New Jersey, they
observed the cohort of adult TANF recipients who entered TANF in November of 2001 and
found that after 18 months, 13 percent of the New Jersey cohort, and 17 percent of the Illinois
cohort, had been sanctioned. In South Carolina, they could only observe clients for 10 months
and found that 5 percent were ultimately sanctioned. We estimated comparable sanctioning rates
in Florida by relying on the same panel method utilized by Pavetti et al. (2004). Based on the
cohort of Florida’s adult TANF recipients who entered TANF in November, 2001, we found that
after 10 months, 43 percent had been sanctioned at least once, and after 18 months, the sanction
rate increased to 47 percent. Given the magnitude of the difference in the sanctioning rates
between Florida and these three other states, there is good reason to believe that Florida is among
the leaders in the use of sanctions.
Local Variation in Sanctioning
Although it appears that the mean sanction rate in Florida may indeed be relatively high
compared to other states, we expect that there has been significant variation around that mean
due to the highly decentralized nature of TANF implementation in Florida, To test this
expectation, we calculated county sanction rates using a method similar to the panel method
advocated by Pavetti, et al. (2004), but with a few modifications. First, rather than relying on one
specific cohort, we observed sanctioning outcomes for the 24 cohorts entering TANF from
January 2001 through December 2002. Second, within each cohort we limited our observation to
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“new” TANF clients, defined as clients who did not receive TANF for a minimum of 12
consecutive months prior to entering TANF. Third, we focused exclusively on the first TANF
spell for each cohort, where we defined a spell as continuous months of TANF receipt. And
fourth, we examined each cohort for a maximum of 12 consecutive months. To calculate a
county’s sanction rate, we first calculated the sanction rate for each cohort as the percentage of
the cohort that exited TANF due to a sanction. We then calculated the average sanction rate
across the 24 cohorts to arrive at a final county sanction rate for each of the 66 counties in our
dataset.
Based on these calculations, the mean sanction rate across all 66 counties was 39%. This
means that for the 24 cohorts of new TANF clients entering TANF in 2001 and 2002, at least
39% were sanctioned off TANF during their first TANF spell.8 As anticipated, there has been
significant variation in county sanction rates during our study period. This is evident in Figure 4,
which displays county sanction rates for the upper and lower quartiles of the county distribution.
As can be seen in the figure, four counties display a sanction rate of less than 30%, with
Hamilton county exhibiting the lowest sanction rate in the sample at 22%. In contrast, three
counties sanctioned at a rate of at least 50%, with Okeechobee displaying the highest sanction
rate of all counties at 53%. Thus, the maximum sanction rate in our sample exceeded the
minimum sanction rate by 141%. These differences are both statistically and substantively
significant, and suggest that sanction implementation is carried out in fundamentally different
ways across the state.
(Figure 4)

8

As these calculations are based on a maximum spell of 12 months, we underestimate the first
spell sanction rate to the extent that clients were sanctioned after 12 months. However, we find
that spells of more than 12 consecutive months in Florida are extremely rare.
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Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis, we provide a preliminary test of the
influence of the political environment on sanctions implementation by examining the bivariate
relationship between the local sanction rates presented in Figure 4 and our index of county
conservatism. This relationship is displayed in the form of a scatterplot in Figure 5, and provides
some initial evidence of a relationship between local sanctioning outcomes and the political
environment. This relationship is also confirmed by the estimated regression line (b=.08, p=.03),
which is also plotted in the figure. Despite the statistical significance of this relationship, it is
clearly far from perfect and suggests that there are likely many other factors that may be
influencing sanctioning outcomes as well. Thus, we now move to a more detailed and rigorous
multivariate analysis of sanctioning outcomes that relies on individual level data.
(Figure 5)
An Event History Model of Sanction Initiation
Our event history analysis relies on individual level administrative data on TANF adults
provided by the Florida DCF, supplemented with data on county political and socioeconomic
characteristics. Specifically, our sample consists of all new adult TANF clients entering TANF
during the 24-month period from January 2001 through December 2002.9 Thus, our entire period
of analysis extends from January 2001 (first cohort enters) through November 2003 (12th month
of spell for last cohort). The dependent variable for our analysis is a dichotomous variable that
takes on a value of 1 in the month that a client is sanctioned. We follow each of the 24 cohorts
for up to a maximum of 12 consecutive months, ending our observation of the case at the spell’s
termination or at the 12-month mark, whichever comes first. Clients who exit for reasons other
than sanction, or who are not sanctioned by the 12th month of the spell, are treated as right9

We define “new” TANF clients as those clients who have spent at least twelve continuous
months without TANF benefits.
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censored. For the purposes of this paper, we restrict our attention to the first TANF spell for each
individual during this period, where we define a spell as continuous months of TANF receipt. As
defined, and accounting for a small percentage of cases for which values of some variables are
missing, our total sample size exceeds 64,000 individuals and 183,000 person-months.
We estimate our models using the Cox proportional hazards model. The advantage of the
Cox model is that it allows for flexible, nonparametric estimation of the baseline hazard, or what
we might think of as the effect of spell duration on the probability of sanction (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 2004).10 For each of the variables in our models, we report the estimated
hazard ratio, which reflects the proportional change in the risk of sanction given a one-unit
increase in the independent variable of interest. Given the multilevel character of our data, the pvalues reported in Table 2 are based on standard errors that are adjusted for error correlation
within counties.
The results for our event history model are presented in columns I-IV of Table 2. We
limit our attention for the moment to column I, which displays results for a model which is
restricted to the effects of individual-level variables. Much as we would expect, we find that
sanctions are significantly related to clients’ individual traits. Specifically, TANF sanctions are
significantly more likely to be applied to the small number of men in the program, relative to the
large majority of adult women in the program. We also find that the probability of being
sanctioned is higher for clients who are younger, who are heads of two-parent families, and who
have less than a high school or college education. These results are largely consistent with the
results of past studies (Born, Caudill and Cordero 1999; Hasenfeld, Ghose and Hillesland-Larson
2002; Kalil, Seefeldt and Wang 2002; Keiser, Mueser and Choi 2004; Koraleck 2000; Mancuso
10

We have replicated our findings using other estimation methods as well, including parametric
methods (Weibull), and a discrete-time (logit) model.
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and Liner 2001; Westra and Routely 2000; Wu et al. 2003). In addition, these effects are
consistent across the alternative specifications presented in Table 2 (which we discuss in more
detail below).
(Table 2)
The effects of race and ethnicity are more complicated, as model diagnostics determined
that these effects vary in magnitude across the TANF spell. We deal with this issue by including
multiplicative terms that include the race/ethnicity of client and a simple counter variable (1-12)
representing the month of the TANF spell (Black*Month of Spell, Hispanic*Month of Spell). We
find that in the earliest months of a participation spell, white clients are significantly more likely
to be sanctioned than black or Hispanic clients. However, as the length of the spell grows longer,
black and Hispanic clients become more likely to experience a sanction than their white
counterparts (however in the case of Hispanic clients, the difference at the upper range of the
spell is not statistically significant). Indeed, by the 9th month of the spell, black clients are
predicted to be sanctioned at a rate that is anywhere from 22-35% higher than that of whites
(depending upon model specification). This interaction between race/ethnicity and month of spell
is extremely robust and underscores the importance of employing a longitudinal design, such as
event history analysis, to study racial dynamics in TANF sanctioning.
We now move to the effects of the local political climate, which are reflected in models
II-IV. Model II adds our local conservatism index to the specification presented in model I and
finds that the risk of sanction is significantly higher in conservative counties, even after
controlling for clients’ individual traits. Specifically, the hazard ratio suggests that holding
individual traits constant, the risk of sanction in the most conservative county is 67% higher than
in the most liberal county. Model III adds the rest of our contextual variables to the specification,
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and finds that local ideology is still significantly related to sanctioning, though the effect is
diminished to some degree. Finally, model IV reflects the same specification as model III, but
drops Dade county from the sample as a test of robustness. Dade county is by far the largest
county represented in our sample, claiming 14% of all TANF clients in our estimation sample,
and 17% of all person-month observations. In addition, Dade county is atypical of Florida
counties in many important respects due to its racially mixed population and the diversity of
organizations (i.e. public, private and nonprofit) involved in TANF implementation. Overall, the
results for model IV are very similar to those for model III, suggesting that the presence of Dade
county in the sample does not bias our conclusions. In fact, the effect of local ideology is even
stronger when Dade county is removed from the sample.
While the results presented in Table 2 suggest that the effect of local ideology is
statistically as well as substantively important, an important weakness of the hazard ratio is that
it is limited to describing the relative risk of sanction at a single point in time (i.e. a given month
within the TANF spell). We therefore provide further perspective on the magnitude of this effect
in Figure 6 by examining the cumulative impact of local ideology over the course of the entire
TANF spell. Specifically, Figure 6 plots cumulative survival rates across two contexts – the most
liberal county and the most conservative county – for a typical TANF client. Based on our
results, the probability that a typical TANF client residing in the most conservative county will
survive through the 12th month of a TANF spell without a sanction is approximately .20. In
contrast, the probability that the same (hypothetical) client will survive through the 12th month
without a sanction in the most liberal county is approximately .40, or twice that of the survival
rate in the most conservative county. Of course, very few clients will ever experience a 12 month
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TANF spell, but this simulation does provide additional perspective on the substantive impact of
local ideology on sanctioning outcomes.
(Figure 6)
Returning to the effects of other variables in our model, the effects of the local
racial/ethnic context provide some evidence that sanctioning is reduced in areas where the
minority population is large. This provides support for the notion that racial/ethnic minorities are
able to exert influence over TANF policy outcomes, however we are unable to determine if this
effect is due to indirect pressure on TANF officials, or through greater representation among
case managers and TANF administrators. The results are strongest for Hispanic%, as the
coefficient reaches statistical significance in model III. However, when Dade county is dropped
from the sample, this coefficient falls just below the threshold for significance. The coefficient
for Black% is consistently negative, and while it does not reach the .05 threshold for statistical
significance in any of our specifications, it consistently comes close to significance in each
model in Table 2 (.10 < p < .20, two-tailed).
In addition to the local political environment, the results in Table 2 suggest that
sanctioning outcomes are also influenced by the socioeconomic environment in which TANF is
implemented. We find that all else equal, the risk of sanction is greater in large urban counties,
and where poverty rates are relatively higher. These results may reflect the effects of
environments in which jobs are less accessible, or for other reasons specific to the local
environment, TANF clients find the demands of the program more difficult to meet.
Interestingly, the size of the TANF caseload is negatively related to sanctioning. This lends some
support to the possibility that case managers with heavy caseloads have less time to spend
monitoring their clients, or that they find it more difficult to follow through with the
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administrative burden of the sanction process. Contrary to expectations, we find relatively weak
effects for two aspects of local labor markets, as neither unemployment rates nor local wage
levels proved to be significant predictors of sanctions.
Finally, in addition to the effects of individual traits and variables reflecting
characteristics of the local community, we also find evidence of a seasonal pattern to
sanctioning, as reflected in the set of coefficients reflecting the effects of each calendar month.
This seasonal effect is graphically displayed in Figure 7, where the bars in the figure represent
the hazard ratio associated with each monthly effect. As the omitted (i.e. baseline) month in the
analysis, the hazard ratio for August is set at 1.0. Thus, the values of the remaining hazard ratios
represented in the figure can be interpreted as the proportional increase in the risk of sanction in
that month, compared to the risk of sanction in the month of August. The pattern of the bars in
Figure 7 suggests that the risk of sanction is higher during the winter months and early spring,
peaking in the month of March. The risk of sanction then declines during the summer and early
fall, reaching its minimum level in August. This pattern corresponds almost exactly with
fluctuations in the tourist industry, a fact which is confirmed by the line in the graph representing
monthly (statewide) taxable sales generated from tourism and recreation. The relationship
between these seasonal effects and tourism sales is extremely strong (r = .95), suggesting that
sanctioning patterns may, in some way, be related to labor market demands that are driven by the
tourist economy. The causal mechanism connecting sanctioning and tourism remains
undetermined, and certainly deserves further investigation.
(Figure 7)
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CONCLUSION
Within the TANF program, sanction policies have become the key tool for signaling
clients that they must take the welfare-to-work philosophy seriously and meet the slate of
obligations detailed in their Individual Responsibility Plans, or they will lose access to cash
assistance. Given the importance of sanctioning to clients’ well-being, a number of studies have
examined the determinants of sanctioning to gain a better understanding of who is being
sanctioned, and why. Although this literature has furthered our understanding of the impact of
sanctioning, it has been almost exclusively “client-centered” in its theoretical approach by
neglecting to consider the effects of the welfare system and implementation. Our analysis
attempts to shed some light on these effects by examining local variation in sanctioning across
the state of Florida, which stands as a leader in the use of sanctioning. Based on our findings,
three issues strike us as meriting special attention.
First, several studies have shown that states have used the discretion granted to them
through first-order devolution to tailor their welfare programs to the ideological tastes of their
citizens (e.g. Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 2001). As we have seen, however, welfare
reform has also been characterized by second-order devolution, thus increasing the importance of
local discretion in welfare reform outcomes. Has second-order devolution had a similar effect?
Our analysis suggests that at least in one state, second-order devolution may indeed be working
in a similar fashion. Based on our analysis of sanctioning outcomes in Florida, we find
significant variation in local sanctioning practices, even after controlling for such important
individual traits as education, race, and income. More importantly, we find strong evidence that
local differences are not random, but instead are strongly tied to local political values. We cannot
pinpoint the causal mechanism that is driving this finding, yet there is good reason to believe it is
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rooted in the decentralized nature of TANF implementation in Florida, along with the inherent
discretion present in the sanctioning process.
A second important finding that emerges from our analysis is the importance of social
class variables in determining sanctioning outcomes. Consistent with prior research, we find that
individuals with lower levels of human capital, as reflected by lower education and income
levels, are significantly more likely to be sanctioned. In addition to these individual level effects,
however, we also find evidence that class exhibits a contextual effect, as the probability of
sanction is higher among clients who live in poverty-stricken areas. Further research is needed to
pinpoint the causal mechanism that is driving this effect, but to the extent that it is due to local
variation in economic opportunity, this suggests that policy solutions which take the local
economic context into account may be warranted.
Finally, our analysis underscores the potential importance of using a longitudinal design
to study sanctioning outcomes. This conclusion is supported by at least two important aspects of
our findings - the existence of a seasonal pattern to sanctioning, and the relationship between
race and sanctioning. Our analysis suggests that holding other variables constant, the overall rate
of sanctioning in Florida is higher during the peak tourist season than it is during the summer
months. This suggests that cross-sectional studies, which are conducted in a relatively short
period of time, may reach conclusions that cannot be reliably generalized to rest of the year.
Similarly, we also find that racial and ethnic differences in sanctioning are related to the length
of the TANF spell. This suggests that sanctioning disparity may be a more complex phenomenon
than we have thus far understood, and is therefore best studied using a longitudinal design.
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APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics for Analyses Presented in Table 2
Independent Variables

Definition

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum
& Maximum

Individual Characteristics
Gender

0=Female, 1=Male

.136

.343

0-1

Age

Client age, in years

30.7

9.04

18-102

Single-Parent

1=Single parent,
0=otherwise, based on
# of adults in family

.797

.402

0-1

562.578

1336.728

0-76013

1= <12 years education,
0 =otherwise

.464

.499

0-1

1= 12 years education,
0 =otherwise

.345

.475

0-1

1=black,
0=otherwise

.407

.491

0-1

1=Hispanic,
0=otherwise

.190

.392

0-1

Month of Spell for each
client

2.895

2.386

1-12

Local Conservatism Index

See appendix B

.461

.220

0-1

County Black Population %

% black in county of
client (Census, April
2000)

15.613

7.288

2.1 – 57.1

%Hispanic in county of
client (Census, April
2000)

18.148

18.939

1.5 – 57.3

Average annual income
for employees (2002)
(NAICS 722)

12624.76

1888.585

7795- 16674

Wage Income

Education (reference = >12 years)
Less than H.S. Education

H.S. Education

Race/Ethnic (referece=white, non-Hisp)
Black

Hispanic

Month of Spell

Wage income, from
previous quarter

Political Environment

County Hispanic Population %

Economic Environment
Average Wage – Food Service/Drinking
Places
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County Unemployment Rate (t-1)

County Poverty Rate

TANF Caseload (per 1000 county
population)

Total Population

Unemployment rate in
county of client,
measured each month
(Florida Research and
Economic Database)

5.344

1.635

1.7 - 19.7

County poverty rate for
all persons in 2000
(U.S. Census Bureau,
Small Area Income &
Poverty Estimates)

12.583

3.298

6.9 - 24.2

Ratio of county TANF
caseload to total county
population * 1000

2.092

1.083

.142 - 6.907

Total Population for
Each County (2000), in
millions

.899

.753

.007 - 2.253
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APPENDIX B

Construction of Index of County Political Ideology

To construct our index of local ideology we collected data on 18 ideologically relevant
constitutional amendments that appeared on a statewide ballot for ratification from 1996 through
2004. We computed the percentage of “yes” votes for each amendment, for each county, and
conducted a factor analysis using all 18 amendments (thus 18 variables, N=67 counties). The
subjects of these amendments are listed in the table below.
Year
96
96
96
98
98
98
98
98
98
00
02
02
02
02
04
04
04
04

Amendment
Tax Limitation
Pollution Costs
Sugar Fee
Death Penalty (For)
Tax Exemption
Public Education
Basic Rights
Election Reform
Gun Control
Public Transit
Smoking Ban
Universal Pre-K
Class Size Reduction
Animal Cruelty
Abortion Rights (Limit)
Minimum Wage
Medical Compensation Limits
Slot Machines
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Table 1. Selected Characteristics of the Florida and U.S. Adult TANF
Populations
Total Florida
Adult
(2000 – 2004)

Total U.S.
Adult
(FY 2002)

Ethnicity / Race
White
Black
Hispanic

33.7
36.2
28.5

31.6
38.3
24.9

Gender
Female
Male

83.6
16.4

90
10

Single-Parenta

73.7

75.5

Citizenship
Yes
No

83.3
16.7

92.5
7.5

Ageb
18-19
20-29
30-39
40+
Average

7.1
43.1
32.5
17.5
30.9

7.5
44.9
29.9
17.7
31

Education
<12 years
12 years
>12 years
Median

52.8
34.3
12.9
11

45.2
51.4
3.3
12

Residence
Broward (Ft. Lauderdale)
Dade (Miami)
Duval (Jacksonville)
Hillsborough (Tampa)
Orange (Orlando)
Palm Beach (West Palm Beach)
Pinellas (St. Petersburg)
Rest of State

7
26.4
3.9
4.9
8.2
4.2
5.7
39.7

-----------------

268,620

---

Client Characteristics

Total Adult Unduplicated
Caseload 1/2000 – 4/2004

Source: For Florida statistics, data are calculated from TANF administrative data provided by the Florida DCF. For
national statistics, see Office Family Assistance, Sixth Annual Report to Congress:
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/annualreport6/chapter10/chap10.htm
a
Defined in Florida as only parent in TANF family. For U.S., it is defined as unmarried TANF adults.
b
In Florida, based on age at first month of TANF receipt during study period.
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Table 2. Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Effect of Individual and Community-Level
Characteristics on Sanction Initiation
Independent Variables

I

II

1.209**
.988**
.888**
.989**

1.201**
.989**
.876**
.991**

1.196**
.990**
.857**
.990**

1.182**
.990**
.840**
.990*

1.454**
1.122**

1.465**
1.128**

1.456**
1.128**

1.442**
1.120**

.876*
1.035
1.223*

.943*
1.123**
1.338**

.953*
1.134**
1.349**

.954*
1.129**
1.336*

.781**
.866
.960

.867*
.967
1.078

.931**
1.042
1.165

.925**
1.076
1.251

Political Environment
Local Conservatism Index
Black%
Hispanic%

-------

1.668**
-----

1.405**
.997
.990**

1.636**
.996
.996

Socio-Economic Environment
Annual Wage Food Service/Drinking Places
Unemployment Rate(t-1)
Poverty Rate
Population (in millions)
Per Capita TANF Caseload (t-1)
Month of Year

-------------

-------------

.974
1.014
1.035**
1.278**
.847**
(see Fig. 7)

.963
1.010
1.038**
1.351**
.866**
(not reported)

Number of Subjects
Number of Failures
Time at Risk (Person-Months)

64,630
25,337
183,111

64,630
25,337
183,111

64,630
25,337
183,111

55,354
22,511
152,338

Individual Characteristics
Gender (male )
Age
Single-Parent
Wage Income(t-1)
Education (reference = >H.S.)
Less than H.S. Education
H.S. Education
Race/Ethnicity (reference=white)
Black
3 months
6 months
9 months
Hispanic
3 months
6 months
9 months

III

IV

*p<.05, **p<.01
Note: The sample for this analysis is consists of all new TANF clients who entered TANF from January
2001 through December 2002. All clients are observed for a maximum of twelve months (clients who
exit without being sanctioned, or who were sanctioned after twelve months, are treated as censored). Cell
entries are hazard ratios, and reflect the proportional change in the hazard of sanction, given a one-unit
increase in the independent variable of interest. P-values are based on robust standard errors (adjusted for
error clustering at the county level).
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Figure 1. Relationship between County Conservatism Index and Average County
Conservative Identification (Survey-Based)
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Figure 2. Total Adult TANF Caseload by Race/Ethnic Identification,
January 2000-December 2003
A. Total Adult Caseload
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B. Adult Caseload, by Race/Ethnicity
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Figure 3. Monthly TANF Sanctions, Exits, and Sanction Rates in Florida,
January 2000 – December 2003
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Figure 4. Percentage of TANF Adults Sanctioned During First TANF Spell (Average of 24
Cohorts Entering TANF from January 2001 – December 2002)
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Figure 5. Relationship between County Sanction Rate and Local Conservatism
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Figure 6. Cumulative Survival Rates for a Typical TANF Adult, by Local Political
Ideology
0.9

Predicted Survival Rate

0.8
0.7
0.6
Most Liberal County

0.5

Most Conservative
County

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12

Month of Spell

Note: Survival rates are estimated for a 31 year-old white woman with 12 years of education and
average level of wage income. These estimates are based on the results presented in column II of
Table 2.
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Figure 7. Estimated Hazard Ratio and Total Tourism/Recreation Taxable Sales,
by Month of Year
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Source: Hazard ratios are taken from the model reflected in column III of Table 2. Sales data
reflect 2002, and are reported by Visit Florida (Florida Visitor Report 2003).

